| Call Number | 12344 |
|---|---|
| Day & Time Location |
M 2:10pm-4:00pm 716 Philosophy Hall |
| Points | 3 |
| Grading Mode | Standard |
| Approvals Required | None |
| Instructor | Katja Vogt |
| Type | SEMINAR |
| Method of Instruction | In-Person |
| Course Description | Prerequisites: the instructor's permission. At least one foundational course in moral philosophy is recommended as background for this course. In this seminar we will take up several questions about moral understanding and insight. Questions we will consider include: Can trusting moral testimony ever be rational or right? Are the reasons to be cautions about relying on moral testimony moral reasons or epistemic reasons (or both)? What assumptions about moral knowledge do critics and defenders of moral testimony make? How does moral knowledge differ, if it does, from moral understanding? Is there such a thing as moral expertise? Is there any reason to think that moral expertise is more problematic than other kinds of expertise? Can emotions inform us about value? Under what conditions, if any, can emotions contribute to our understanding of value? Under what conditions are emotions impediments to moral knowledge or understanding? Can fictions help us gain moral insight? Can pictures ever be legitimate tools of moral persuasion? |
| Web Site | Vergil |
| Department | Philosophy |
| Enrollment | 14 students (25 max) as of 5:06PM Saturday, February 1, 2025 |
| Subject | Philosophy |
| Number | GR9180 |
| Section | 001 |
| Division | Graduate School of Arts and Sciences |
| Note | Approaches to Applied Ethics |
| Section key | 20243PHIL9180G001 |