Call Number | 14008 |
---|---|
Day & Time Location |
W 2:10pm-4:00pm To be announced |
Points | 3 |
Grading Mode | Standard |
Approvals Required | None |
Instructors | Cailin Slattery Ashley Swanson |
Type | LECTURE |
Course Description | Prerequisites: ECON G6211 and ECON G6212. This is an empirical course comprised of two parts. The first part examines single agent dynamics, and multi-agent dynamics (dynamic games). Both methodological advances and empirical applications will be discussed. Some of the topics that will be covered include: investment and replacement problems, durable goods, consumer learning, price dispersion and search costs, learning by doing, and networks and switching costs. There will be a strong focus on estimation details of dynamic oligopoly models. The second part of the course will review empirical models of imperfect information including auctions, moral hazard, and adverse selection. |
Web Site | Vergil |
Department | Economics |
Enrollment | 0 students (25 max) as of 1:06PM Saturday, May 10, 2025 |
Subject | Economics |
Number | GR6255 |
Section | 001 |
Division | Graduate School of Arts and Sciences |
Open To | Engineering:Graduate, GSAS, SIPA |
Campus | Morningside |
Section key | 20241ECON6255G001 |