| Call Number | 14008 |
|---|---|
| Day & Time Location |
W 2:10pm-4:00pm To be announced |
| Points | 3 |
| Grading Mode | Standard |
| Approvals Required | None |
| Instructors | Cailin Slattery Ashley Swanson |
| Type | LECTURE |
| Course Description | Prerequisites: ECON G6211 and ECON G6212. This is an empirical course comprised of two parts. The first part examines single agent dynamics, and multi-agent dynamics (dynamic games). Both methodological advances and empirical applications will be discussed. Some of the topics that will be covered include: investment and replacement problems, durable goods, consumer learning, price dispersion and search costs, learning by doing, and networks and switching costs. There will be a strong focus on estimation details of dynamic oligopoly models. The second part of the course will review empirical models of imperfect information including auctions, moral hazard, and adverse selection. |
| Web Site | Vergil |
| Department | Economics |
| Enrollment | 0 students (25 max) as of 8:07PM Wednesday, October 29, 2025 |
| Subject | Economics |
| Number | GR6255 |
| Section | 001 |
| Division | Graduate School of Arts and Sciences |
| Open To | Engineering:Graduate, GSAS, SIPA |
| Campus | Morningside |
| Section key | 20241ECON6255G001 |