| Call Number | 14005 |
|---|---|
| Day & Time Location |
W 10:10am-12:00pm To be announced |
| Points | 3 |
| Grading Mode | Standard |
| Approvals Required | None |
| Instructor | Qingmin Liu |
| Type | LECTURE |
| Course Description | Prerequisites: the instructors permission. This course develops theory of designing markets--namely, ;mechanisms; of allocating resources--that are efficient, fair and non-manipulable. Understanding the incentives participants face under alternative mechanisms will be a central theme of the course. Specifically, the course will consist of two parts. The first part deals with environments where monetary transfers can be used, and focuses on topics such as optimal nonlinear pricing, optimal auction design, property rights assignment, dynamic mechanisms and assignment games/sponsored search auctions in Internet advertising. The second part concerns market design without monetary transfers and discusses matching theory as a primarily tool for analyzing the topic. Specifically, we shall discuss matching of agents on one side with agents on the other and matching of agents to indivisible resources/positions, and apply the theories to problems of house allocation, centralized labor market matching, and school choice. |
| Web Site | Vergil |
| Department | Economics |
| Enrollment | 0 students (45 max) as of 5:06PM Saturday, May 10, 2025 |
| Subject | Economics |
| Number | GR6219 |
| Section | 001 |
| Division | Graduate School of Arts and Sciences |
| Open To | Engineering:Graduate, GSAS, SIPA |
| Campus | Morningside |
| Section key | 20241ECON6219G001 |